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Abstract— This paper presents a case study of how 
factors such as wind prediction errors and metering delays 
can influence controller performance and workload in 
Human-In-The-Loop simulations. Retired air traffic 
controllers worked two arrival sectors adjacent to the 
terminal area. The main tasks were to provide safe air 
traffic operations and deliver the aircraft to the metering 
fix within ±25 seconds of the scheduled arrival time with 
the help of provided decision support tools. Analyses 
explore the potential impact of metering delays and system 
uncertainties on controller workload and performance. The 
results suggest that trajectory prediction uncertainties 
impact safety performance, while metering fix accuracy 
and workload appear subject to the scenario difficulty. 
Keywords-trajectory uncertainties, difficulty, metering delay, 
decision support tools 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Air Traffic Management (ATM) systems are complex, 
dynamic, information-driven systems operated by humans. 
Traffic demand is predicted to grow steadily in the next 20 
years and consequently, air traffic controllers will need to 
handle increasingly complex traffic situations [1]. To combat 
these problems, proponents of various ATM modernization 
programs (such as SESAR and NextGen) are developing new 
automation-based technologies to support controllers in 
maintaining a safe and efficient flow of air traffic, while doing 
so within reasonable levels of cognitive workload.  
Trajectory Based Operations (TBO) will likely be a central 
element of future ATM systems. As such, it requires enhanced 
precision in predicting the individual flight trajectory, 
especially when controllers are tasked to reduce delays in the 
arrival time. This paper describes a study which investigates 
the impact of uncertainties in the input data (wind forecast data, 
aircraft performance models and air speed profile), and the 
resulting trajectory prediction errors’ impact on controller 
workload. Air traffic controllers were asked to meter aircraft to 
a fix within ±25 seconds, without compromising the separation 
between aircraft. The count of loss of separation events, the 
metering fix delivery accuracy and the controller workload 
represent performance indicators to evaluate the controller 
ability to work with imprecise decision support tools. The goal 
was to find a point at which trajectory prediction uncertainties 
underlying the decision support tools would become 
unacceptable for the controllers [2]. This paper will investigate 
the question: Do the traffic scenarios have a bigger impact on 
performance and workload than error conditions? 
The aim of this paper is not only to discuss the terms 
‘difficulty’ and ‘complexity’ in context of controller workload 
and performance, but also to examine the influence of 
trajectory prediction uncertainties in this context.  
II. BACKGROUND 
A. Scenario difficulty 
The term ‘difficulty’ appears repeatedly in the context of 
complexity definitions [3], whereas Sousa identifies a 
difference between complexity and difficulty [4]. An example 
in the air traffic environment shows the following case in 
Figure 1: The baseline traffic scenario (A) has 3 aircraft; the 
controller task is to monitor these aircraft for separation. A 
higher level of difficulty (B) can be reached by increasing the 
amount of traffic, whereas complexity (C) can be for instance 
achieved by a conflict situation. Instead of simply monitoring 
aircraft (like in B), this requires a more careful assessment of 
the situation to monitor for conflicts. Difficulty refers to the 
subject’s memory, whereas the complexity task requires 
analyzing, evaluating and solving the situation [4].  
 
Figure 1. Baseline (A), Increased Difficulty (B), Increased Complexity (C). 
Several studies used the variation of aircraft count as a 
regulator to evaluate controller performance and workload [5]. 
Schmidt proposed that the amount of time a controller needs to 
process a given event is a measure of complexity. Conflicts top 
the list with the highest process time. This notion of an event’s 
complexity, combined with the event’s frequency, is believed 
to lead to higher workload [6].  
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Other research studied different approaches and 
contributing factors to models of difficulty and complexity [7, 
8], but, to the best of our knowledge, none of those utilized 
uncertainties and metering tasks to influence controller 
workload and performance in a Human-In-The-Loop 
simulation. 
B. Trajectory Prediction Uncertainties 
The term ‘uncertainty’ describes a state of doubt about the 
future [9] and can be caused by different factors. In “Common 
Methodology and Resources for the Validation and 
Improvement of Trajectory Prediction Capabilities,” the 
uncertainty management is described as critical [10]. There is 
always a probability that a system’s predictions can be 
unreliable, and would present controllers with incorrect 
recommendations from the decision support tools. Morey 
examined how controllers cope with trajectory prediction 
uncertainties focusing on sector performance and automation 
usage. The results show that controllers developed strategies to 
compensate for the different levels of uncertainties while 
managing aircraft delay [11]. 
III. METHOD 
A. Overview of study 
A Human-In-The-Loop simulation, called Trajectory 
Prediction Uncertainty (TPU) at the Airspace Operations 
Laboratory, took place during January 2013. Twelve retired air 
traffic controllers were separated into two test groups to work 
identical, independent simulations. Two controller of each 
team operated one high-altitude sector and one low-altitude 
sector, which fed the northwest corner of the Atlanta Terminal 
Radar Approach Control (TRACON). The main tasks were to 
provide safe air traffic operations and deliver the aircraft to the 
metering fix within ±25 seconds of the scheduled arrival time 
with the help of the following decision support tools [2, 11]: 
 Delay display in data block 
 Meter list at ERLIN 
 Conflict list with time to conflict in data block 
 Trial planning tools 
Controllers worked traffic scenarios under different 
uncertainty conditions, where errors in forecast wind data and 
aircraft performance models were varied. The first part of the 
one-week study used a balanced test matrix with all conditions 
tested in two different traffic scenarios; a third scenario was 
introduced later, in the exploratory portion of the study.  
Data collected during the simulation included subjective 
feedback from the participants, in form of the real-time 
workload ratings measured with the Air Traffic Workload 
Input Technique (ATWIT) [5], and objective performance 
indicators, such as delivery accuracy at the metering fix and the 
count of loss of separation events. More details regarding the 
experiment appear in [2]. 
B. Sources of uncertainties 
The TPU study varied uncertainties inherent in the system’s 
trajectory predictions to investigate the impact of errors on 
controller performance and workload.  
Previous studies have noted that wind, aircraft performance 
model and weight are major sources for trajectory prediction 
errors [12, 13]. Table 1 shows an overview of the error sources 
used during the TPU simulation, and their influence on the 
trajectory prediction. 
Table 1. Manipulated error sources in the TPU simulation. 
Error source Implementation Effect 
Wind Forecast 
Variation between 
forecast wind data and 
real environment 
Ground speed, track, 
displacement of Top of 
Descent 
Aircraft 
performance model 
Variations in the 
aircraft weight factor 
Different descent 
profiles caused by 
displacement of Top of 
Descent 
The simulation investigated the impact of wind forecast 
errors, and their effect on trajectory prediction, across five 
levels. This paper will focus on three of those levels. The no 
wind error case (perfect prediction) signified an impossible 
case at present, but provided controller performance data in an 
uncertainty-free environment as a baseline reference. Current-
day operations were assumed to have forecast errors of 
approximately 10 knots, which was represented by the realistic 
wind error case. In the large wind error case, the forecast 
winds differed from the actual winds by an average of 
30 knots. Additionally, the wind forecast errors were 
configured as either positive or negative wind biases, 
representing wind over-predictions or wind under-predictions, 
as shown in Table 2.  
Table 2. Variation of wind velocity forecast errors and error biases [kts]. 
 No error Realistic error Large error 
Wind bias positive 0 10 30 
(environment/forecast) 70/70 70/80 70/100 
Wind bias negative 0 -10 -30 
(environment/forecast) 90/90 90/80 90/60 
The second simulated uncertainty is related to the system’s 
aircraft performance models. Manipulations to the weight of 
individual aircraft served to impact their actual descent and 
climb profiles, thereby differing from the nominal descent and 
climb profiles assumed by the ground system. Translated as 
Top of Descent (TOD) or Top of Climb (TOC) errors (i.e., 
location of assumed TOD/TOC vs. location of actual 
TOD/TOC), a no aircraft performance error case served as a 
baseline (although unrealistically perfect) condition, errors 
around ±5 % represented a realistic aircraft performance error 
case approximating current-day operations, and errors around 
±25 % a represent a large aircraft performance error case. The 
realistic and large errors were implemented separate, normal 
distributions over arrival and non-arrival aircraft.  
The TPU simulation also included Flight Technical Errors 
(FTE), modeled as errors in the airspeed guidance accuracy. 
For all aircraft in the simulation, the Vertical Navigation 
Guidance (VNAV) corrected speed deviations only when 
current speeds differed from the target speed by more than 10 
knots. The presence of these errors was constant across all 
conditions.  
C. Design of traffic scenarios 
The basic scenario was created according to [14]. An hour 
of recorded live traffic formed a base scenario, which required 
several adjustments in preparation for the simulation 
environment [15]. Since the study’s focus was on aircraft 
arriving from the northwest into Atlanta, the scenarios only 
included arrivals, departures and overflights directly 
concerning the test airspace and the surrounding sectors.  
The resulting file was divided into two separate files; one 
containing only the arrivals into Atlanta, and the other 
containing only the overflights and departure traffic. 
Modifications to the initial conditions of the arrival aircraft 
allowed researchers to manipulate the delays against scheduled 
arrival times. Three scenarios were created with different 
amount of delay, in other words difficulty levels: Low, 
moderate, and high. The same overflight and departure traffic 
were added to the different arrival scenario files, ensuring that 
the circumambient traffic was consistent across all scenarios. 
The method process of building the three scenarios used 
only the no wind error environment. Other factors potentially 
affecting scenario complexity were similarly held constant 
across the three scenarios airspace factors (sector dimensions, 
standard flows etc.), traffic factors (density of traffic, ranges of 
aircraft performance etc.) and operational constrains 
(procedural restrictions, communication limitations etc.) [16], 
besides the previously mentioned uncertainty conditions and 
the amount of metering delay.  
As Table 3 shows, the amount of delay at the metering fix 
ERLIN reveals noticeable differences between the scenarios. 
These differences are an indication of the amount of space 
between the arrival aircraft and not the amount of aircraft. 
Larger delays would be expected when aircraft spaced closely 
together conform to the schedule. The same schedule then, in 
the presence of aircraft spaced farther apart, would result in 
less delay. During the TPU simulation, aircraft were scheduled 
two minutes apart at ERLIN. 
Table 3. Delays at ERLIN in no error condition (no controller involvement). 
 
Scenario Difficulty 
Low Moderate High 
Average delay at ERLIN 
[min:s] 0:20 0:38 0:45 
Figure 2 shows the airspace characteristics and the wind 
field (orange wind vectors in background) used in this study. 
Two major arrival traffic routes merged at the ERLIN metering 
fix: A western route over CALCO, and the northern route over 
NEUTO. The aircraft entered the high-altitude sector at or 
below FL 350 and began their descent into Atlanta. Working 
below FL 240, the low-altitude sector merged the flows at 
RMG, before delivering the aircraft to the TRACON at 
12000 ft and 280 kts at ERLIN. 
 
Figure 2. Depiction of the sectors for the arrival flow into Atlanta with 
northwest wind (low sector reaches from FL 100 to FL 239; high sector 
above FL 240). 
D. Configuration of study 
A common research method is based on the principle 
“Ceteris Paribus”, which means that only one variable can 
change at a time and others will held constant. The conducted 
study adapted this theory to create the different uncertainty 
conditions [2]. This paper examines a subset of three of the 
study’s conditions, identified as the pairings of the three wind 
forecast error cases with the matching aircraft performance 
error cases.  
These three conditions were examined with the three traffic 
scenarios at 55 minutes each. It is worth noting that the traffic 
scenario designed with high amounts of delay (i.e., high 
difficulty), was not simulated in the no error condition since it 
was used in the exploratory part of the study. Additionally, the 
wind forecast error’s bias direction was distributed across the 
traffic scenarios and uncertainty conditions as shown Table 4. 
Table 4. Combination of the errors and scenario difficulties. 
Error  
No error Realistic error Large error Difficulty 
Low  0kts -10kts -30kts 
Moderate  0kts 10kts 30kts 
High  - -10kts -30kts 
IV. RESULTS 
This section describes analyses of how the uncertainty 
conditions and the characteristics of the exercised traffic 
scenarios impacted controller performance and workload. Data 
from open-loop runs (no controller involvement) provided 
reference measurements, helping to isolate the natural 
characteristics of each traffic scenario, and are presented first, 
followed by results from the high sector of the Human-In-The-
Loop simulation, which offer insights regarding how the 
controllers reacted to the varying conditions.  
A. Open-loop runs
The open-loop runs provided the opportunity to understand 
how the wind impacted the amount of metering delay, and 
across the different arrival flows. Table 5 shows how the 
schedule delay evolved to the two wind bias directions. As the 
uncertainty conditions progressed from ‘no errors’ to ‘large 
errors,’ the negative wind bias produced decreasing amounts of 
delay (as measured when the aircraft entered the high-altitude 
sector). Used with the low- and high-difficulty scenarios, the 
negative wind bias presented the delay as smaller than the 
reality, due to the system’s underestimation of the winds. 
Similarly, the positive biased winds, paired with the moderate-
difficulty scenario, presented the metering delays as being 
larger than they actually were, caused by the system’s 
overestimation of the winds.  
Table 5. Metering fix delay time, measured at the sector entry [min:s]. 
Error  
No error Realistic error Large error Difficulty 
Low  1:08 1:04 0:47 
Moderate 3:26 3:23 3:35 
High  - 3:50 3:08 
In addition to the wind’s speed, its direction influenced the 
metering delay values, and did so differently across the two 
arrival flows. The winds had a greater effect on the northern 
flow over NEUTO, where they were nearly a direct tail wind. 
The wind’s direction relative to the western flow over CALCO 
had a larger cross-wind component, and therefore had less 
impact. Although wind contributed to trajectory prediction 
errors on both arrival flows, the effect was stronger on the 
northern flow [17].  
These analyses confirmed that the direction and the 
magnitude of the wind forecast error substantially influenced 
how the traffic scenarios unfolded. Consequently, the 
interpretation of the Human-In-The-Loop results warrant 
consideration of this finding.  
B. Human-In-The-Loop simulation 
1) Controller Performance 
Figure 3 illustrates the two performance indicators 
(metering fix delivery accuracy and loss of separation events) 
in relation to scenario difficulty (top), and level of uncertainty 
(bottom). The metering fix accuracy metric describes an 
aircraft’s successful delivery at ERLIN. Aircraft crossing the 
metering fix counted as successful if the following criteria were 
met:  
 The aircraft arrived within +/-25 seconds,  
 met the altitude restriction at ERLIN (+/-300 ft), and  
 flew directly over ERLIN.  
Loss of separation events were recorded when the 
separation between two aircraft was less than 4.5 nm laterally 
and 800 ft vertically. A loss of separation event was only 
considered if its duration was longer than 12 seconds.  
 
Figure 3. Influence of difficulty and uncertainty on controller performance 
When averaged across all three uncertainty conditions, the 
metering fix delivery accuracy was generally high across all 
three traffic scenarios, and the highest during the moderate-
difficulty traffic scenario (see upper portion of Figure 3). This 
data challenges the hypothesis that metering fix delivery 
accuracy would worsen as the traffic scenario’s difficulty level 
increased, and instead suggests that controllers were able to 
accurately deliver aircraft to the metering fix regardless of the 
automation’s estimates of how much delay was present.  
Interestingly, unique to the moderate-difficulty scenario 
was the fact that it used the wind forecasts with positive bias 
errors, while the low- and high-difficulty traffic scenarios used 
the negative wind bias. The negative bias wind errors caused 
the automation to present the controller with less delay than in 
reality. An example will demonstrate the effect: The controller 
receives an aircraft predicted to arrive at ERLIN 90 seconds 
early. To meet the scheduled time, the automation recommends 
a slower speed. However, incorporated into the automation’s 
predicted arrival time is the forecasted tail wind, which is 
weaker than the actual tail wind. As a consequence of this 
incorrect assumption, the automation believes the problem to 
be easier than it actually is, and thus suggests a speed reduction 
that is likely too small. As the situation unfolds, the 
automation’s predicted arrival time will update, and the 
controller may need to make another speed reduction. The 
positive wind error bias produces the opposite situation, in 
which the automation predicts an aircraft’s arrival time based 
on stronger-than-actual winds. Here, the automation, believing 
the problem to be worse than it actually is, suggests a speed 
that may be too much of a reduction, effectively 
overcorrecting.  
When compared across all three uncertainty conditions, 
data averaged across all three traffic scenarios showed similar 
trends in the delivery accuracy data (see lower portion of 
Figure 3). However, the simulation’s only recorded separation 
violation occurred in a moderate-difficulty scenario used in 
conjunction with the large uncertainty condition. The 
evaluation of the post-run questionnaire in [2] mentioned that 
controller rated the high-difficulty scenario in the large error 
condition as unsafe and unmanageable. It is possible that either 
(or both) the scenario difficulty or the uncertainty condition 
contributed to the occurrence of the loss of separation events. 
Yet, the data does not appear to support the hypothesis that 
safety performance would worsen as the traffic scenario’s 
difficulty level increased; instead, the data suggests safety 
performance worsened as the system’s prediction uncertainty 
level increased. 
2) Controller Workload 
The low, moderate and high levels of scenario difficulty, 
and the metering tasks associated with those scenarios, are 
reflected in the workload measurements. The ATWIT uses 
Workload Assessment Keypads, which inquire the controller to 
rate workload based on a modified six-point scale (1 as low 
workload, 6 as high workload) in a three-minute interval during 
simulations.  
Both the average and peak workload ratings increase with 
the difficulty of the scenario (see upper portion of Figure 4). 
The trend was different when analyzed in relation to the 
uncertainty conditions, suggesting that the controllers felt they 
did not work harder in conditions with higher levels of system 
uncertainty (see lower portion of Figure 4). Rather, the larger 
metering delays appear to have impacted the controllers’ 
workload.  
 
Figure 4. Influence of difficulty and uncertainty on controller workload 
Another aspect to consider is the workload – performance 
relationship. The charts seem to show that there could have 
been an under-load in the low-difficulty scenario, and an 
overload in the high-difficulty scenario, this would be also an 
explanation according to the trend of the workload (under-load 
= low ratings and overload = high ratings). The AWTIT scale 
considers an under-load below 2 and an overload above 4. 
Consequentially, this consideration is eliminated.  
3) Interaction of difficulty and complexity 
Figure 5 adapts the principle from Figure 1, but applied to 
the route structure used in the simulation. A generic traffic 
example shows an aircraft flow with low delays (A), in which 
the controller can achieve the scheduled times with only small 
speed adjustments. In (B), a higher delay scenario produces 
increased delays. Delays cannot be absorbed with speed 
changes alone, and require the controller to find alternatives to 
achieve the scheduled times. This typically results in vectoring 
the aircraft (C). Such operations are not only workload-
intensive for both controllers and pilots, but also change the 
nominal traffic flow patterns, increasing the number of 
converging and crossing trajectories. This example illustrates 
the close relationship between difficulty and complexity, 
suggesting that difficult situations can easily lead to complex 
situations when aircraft are being vectored to remain on time. 
 
Figure 5. The progression of nominal (A), to difficult (B), and then 
complex (C) traffic situations, in the context of metering. 
The following figure shows the flown trajectories included 
these analyses, for each scenario difficulty level across each 
uncertainty condition. The color gradient represents the 
Indicated Airspeed, associating warmer colors with faster 
speeds (e.g., red = 400 kts), and cooler colors with slower 
speeds (e.g., green = 225 kts, cyan = 160 kts). Differences are 
clearly noticeable between the three difficulty levels. The 
speed profiles and flight paths support the finding that 
workload increased as a function of scenario difficulty level. 
As described in the example scenario illustrated by Figure 5, 
higher metering delay values were associated with more 
vectoring of aircraft. Such maneuvering increases the 
variability of the traffic flow patterns, which in turn increases 
the number of trajectories in potential conflicts, and as a 
result, increases complexity. 
 
Figure 6. Comparison of flown trajectories under different conditions 
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The goal of this case study was to assess whether the 
inherent characteristics of traffic scenarios have a bigger 
impact on performance and workload than uncertainties in the 
underlying system’s prediction capabilities. It appears that the 
error conditions have an impact on the safety performance, 
while the metering fix delivery accuracy and workload seem 
more dependent on the scenario difficulty. Finally, this study 
acknowledges the converging theories on difficulty and 
complexity. Both terms can be specified individually, but 
difficulty has a major influence on complexity. This paper is a 
case study; hence the generalized conclusions originate from 
limited data points from a single simulation. Further studies 
should investigate more in into this topic to validate the results. 
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